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Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
Gábor Virág
Department of Economics, University of Rochester
The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for
buyers by setting reserve prices. An outstanding conjecture (e.g., Peters and Sev-
erinov 1997) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the
market becomes large. This conjecture is conﬁrmed in this paper: we show that
if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in
distribution. Under further conditions there is a symmetric pure strategy equi-
librium. In this equilibrium, if the ratio of buyers to sellers increases, then the
equilibrium reserve price increases, and the reserve price is decreasing in the size
of the market. Convergence of reserve prices occurs at the fast rate of 1/n if the
ratio of buyers to sellers is held constant.
Keywords. Competing auctions, ﬁnite markets, convergence.
JEL classification. D44, D82, D83.
1. Introduction
Inmanymarketssellerscompetebynotsimplypostingprices,butbypostingmorecom-
plicated market mechanisms. A prime example is online auction sites where many dif-
ferent sellers are selling similar objects, and thus the sellers are in direct competition.
When sellers post auctions the choice variable is the reserve price: a seller can try to
attract more buyers by lowering his reserve price or can try his luck by posting a high
reserve price and hoping that buyers will not be deterred. A natural question is how
the equilibrium reserve prices depend on the market size, the buyer to seller ratio, and
other market characteristics. McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997),
Burguet and Sákovics (1999), and others study sellers who compete by posting second-
price auctions setting the reserve price as they wish, and the buyers decide which seller
to visit given the reserve prices posted.1 Peters and Severinov (1997) consider the case
where the market is inﬁnitely large and show that in equilibrium the sellers post reserve
prices that are equal to their production costs. They also show that if there is an equi-
librium for each ﬁnite market size where the sellers post identical (and deterministic)
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reserve prices, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to the cost of production,
which is normalized to zero. However, as Burguet and Sákovics (1999) argue, such an
equilibrium does not exist in the case when there are two sellers, and we extend their ar-
gument to the case of any (ﬁnite) number of sellers. Therefore, the equilibrium reserve
priceinlargebutﬁnitemarketsisnotsettledbythosearticles. Hernando-Veciana(2005)
shows that if only a ﬁnite number of reserve prices are allowed, then the equilibrium re-
servepriceinlarge,butﬁnitemarketsconvergetothecostofthesellers. Whilethisresult
is interesting, it is dependent on the restriction on the set of admissible reserve prices.
Our paper revisits the question of convergence by providing two results. First, we
show that in all equilibria the reserve price each seller posts converges to zero in dis-
tribution (and in support) as the market becomes large. The logic is that as the market
becomes large each seller loses his effect on the utility levels of the buyers and thus has
limited incentives to increase his reserve price. Alternatively, by decreasing the reserve
price a seller is able to attract extra visitors. Since the utility effect is small in large mar-
kets, the seller has just to provide a market utility to the buyers visiting him and can
capture the surplus generated beyond that utility level. This extra surplus stays positive,
since each seller has ﬁnitely many expected visitors regardless of the market size. Thus
an extra visitor increases the probability of sale, increasing the surplus generated by the
seller. As a consequence, decreasing the reserve price offers beneﬁts at little cost to the
seller as the market becomes large.
To conﬁrm this conjecture, we need to show that as the market becomes large, each
seller loses his effect on the utility levels of the buyers. We consider a game with ﬁnitely
many players and use properties of the binomial distribution to derive the desired re-
sult.2 In our proof, we concentrate on the highest reserve price in the support of the
equilibrium and show that the seller who posted that price has an incentive to reduce
his reserve price regardless of what reserve price the other sellers posted if the market is
largeenough. Byfocusingontheupperendofthesupportwecancharacterizerevenues
in a simple formula, utilizing the fact that the seller posting the highest price is visited
onlybythebuyerswiththehighestvaluations. Todothis, weﬁrstcharacterizetheutility
of a buyer type who does not visit the seller who posted the highest reserve price, and
thus his utility changes only because the change in the highest reserve price changes
the visiting probabilities of the other buyers. The change of utility resulting from such a
change in visiting probabilities is relatively easy to characterize by appealing to the en-
velope theorem. We then calculate the utility of buyer types who do visit the seller with
thehighestreservationpricebyusingtheenvelopetheoremandtheutilityofatypewho
does not visit this seller. This indirect method establishes that the utility effect vanishes
in large markets, leading to the convergence result.
2OurapproachisdifferentfromthatofHernando-Veciana(2005), whoapproximateslargeﬁnitemarkets
withthelimitingcaseofinﬁnitelymanyagents. Asaconsequence,heworkswiththemoretractablelimiting
distribution instead of the binomial distribution that arises in games with ﬁnitely many players. Since his
gamehasonlyﬁnitelymanystrategies(reserveprices),thisapproximationworkswell,butinourgamewith
acontinuousactionspacethesameapproximationdoesnotdirectlydeliverthedesiredconvergenceresult.
Our different approach is also useful to obtain closed form solutions for exact e q u i l i b r i a .T h i si se s s e n t i a l
when, in Section 3, we analyze pure strategy equilibria to understand under what conditions convergence
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Our second result concerns cases in which a pure strategy equilibrium exist, i.e.,
where the sellers post nonrandom reserve prices. This is a deviation from the previous
literature that makes assumptions that preclude the existence of a pure strategy equi-
librium. More precisely, the above articles assume that the lowest possible valuation of
the buyers is equal to the production cost (which is normalized to zero in this paper).
Then theﬁrst order condition for selleroptimality suggests that the sellerschoose a zero
reserve price. Then it is costless to increase the reserve price, since only buyers with
the lowest possible valuations (which are zero) are lost. So the second order condition
fails and a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist as was recognized by Burguet and
Sákovics (1999) for the case of two sellers. Therefore, we consider the “gap case,” where
the lowest possible valuation is positive a>0, and we provide a sufﬁcient condition for
a pure strategy equilibrium to exist. We provide intuitive comparative statics results and
also characterize the rate of convergence of the reserve price to zero. If the number of
buyers (sellers) increases, then the equilibrium reserve price increases (decreases), and
the reserve price decreases in the size of the market. The equilibrium reserve price con-
verges to 0 at the quick rate of 1/nif the ratio of sellers to buyers is constant. Moreover,
we show that as long as the number of sellers squared over the number of buyers tends
to inﬁnity as the market becomes large, the equilibrium reserve price must converge to
zero. This ﬁnding highlights that one needs much weaker conditions for convergence to
occur than were previously stipulated.
2. Model and analysis
There are k sellers, each with one unit of an indivisible good, and n risk neutral buyers,
each with a unit demand for the good. The valuation of each buyer is his private infor-
mation, and the valuations are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) accord-
ing to cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F and density f with support [a a + 1],
where a ≥ 0. For simplicity, assume that f is continuous, bounded, and strictly posi-
tive on the support. The timing of the game is simple. First, the k sellers each post a
nonnegative reserve price rk and then the buyers simultaneously decide which seller to
visit after observing all the reserve prices posted. At seller j the buyers present engage
in a second-price auction with reserve price rj without observing the number of other
buyers present.3 The winner of the auction is the buyer with the highest bid; in case of a
tie, the seller ﬂips a fair coin. The payment of the winner is equal to the reserve price if
no other buyer visited seller j and is the highest other bid if there was a competing bid,
whilelosingbiddersdonotpay. Eachsellermaximizeshisexpectedrevenue. Eachbuyer
i obtains a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility (surplus) equal to his valuation vi minus
his payment mi if he wins the auction, and zero otherwise. Finally, buyers maximize
their expected utility.
We now turn to the analysis starting with the buyer’s stage game, taking the reserve
prices set by the sellers (r1 r2     rk) as given. Given that the sellers post second-
price auctions, it is a dominant strategy for each buyer to submit a bid equal to his
3Similarly to Burguet and Sákovics (1999), any mechanism that is efﬁcient when the buyers are sym-
metric, like ﬁrst-price or all-pay auctions, yields similar results. More precisely, there would still be an
equilibrium in which the sellers post reserve prices as characterized below.244 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
valuation at the auction where he participates. Assuming that each buyer follows his
dominant strategy when bidding, the only decision a buyer needs to make is which
seller to visit. We concentrate on equilibria where the buyers employ symmetric vis-
iting strategies. Formally, the probability that buyer i with type v visits seller j when the
reserve prices posted by the k sellers are (r1 r2     rk) is such that π
j
i(v r1 r2     rk) =
πj(v r1 r2     rk). This requirement means that the visiting decision of a buyer de-
pends only on his valuation for the object, but not on the name of the buyer. This re-
quirement is standard in thecompeting mechanisms literature, and capturesthenotion
that in large markets buyers are unable to coordinate their actions and behave in an
anonymous manner.
Let us start the analysis by characterizing the equilibrium visiting strategies of the
buyers given the reserve prices posted by the sellers. Lemma 1 exploits a simple single
crossing property: a buyer with lower valuation is less eager to obtain the good and
thus he is willing to pay less. Therefore, buyers with lower valuations are more likely to
visit sellers who posted lower reserve prices as in the two-seller analysis of Burguet and
Sákovics (1999).
Lemma 1. Assume that the sellers post reserve prices (r1 r2     rk) such that r1 ≤ r2 ≤
···≤rk−1 ≤ rk <a+ 1. Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the buyers’
stage game. This equilibrium is characterized by cutoff strategies: there exist (unique)
cutoff types (t1     tk−1) such that max{a r1}=t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤···≤tk−1 ≤ tk = a + 1,a n d
buyer types between tl and tl+1 visit the ﬁrst l + 1 sellers each with probability 1/(l + 1),
while types less than t0 do not visit any seller.
The proofs of Lemmas 1, 3,a n d4 are given in the Appendix.
While very high types (above tk−1) randomize between all k sellers, lower types re-
strict their visits to sellers who posted lower reserve prices. Very low types (types lower
than t1) visit only the seller with the lowest reserve price. The existence of such cut-
off types can be established following the two-seller analysis provided by Burguet and
Sákovics (1999). We establish the uniqueness of the cutoff types by making use of the
incentive conditions of the buyers in an iterative procedure.
Let us characterizethe equilibrium utility of the buyers in their stage game when the
reserve prices posted are already ﬁxed at (r1 r2     rk). Since all buyers follow symmet-
ric strategies by assumption, the equilibrium utility of a buyer depends only on his val-
uation, but not on his name. Also, as the lemma above claims, there is a unique equilib-
rium in the buyers’ stage game and thus the equilibrium utility of the buyers is uniquely
determined. Therefore, let u(x r1 r2     rk) denote the equilibrium (expected) utility
of a buyer with type x ∈[ a a + 1] in the buyers’ stage game given the posted reserve
prices. For brevity, we simply refer to this utility as u(x) when this does not create any
confusion.
The result that the (symmetric) equilibrium of the buyers’ stage game is unique has
important implications also for continuity properties. As we show in the proof of the
above lemma, the cutoff types (t0 t1     tk−1 tk) are solutions to a system of equations
that are polynomial in the reserve prices. Therefore, the correspondence that describesTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 245
the equilibrium cutoff values for any reserve price vector is upper-hemicontinuous. The
above lemma implies that the correspondence is also single-valued and thus the cutoff
types are continuous in the reserve prices.
We now show that the equilibrium (expected) revenue functions are continuous in
the cutoff types and reserve prices. For simplicity let us consider a small deviation of
seller j such that for all l  = j we have rl  = rj.4 To calculate the revenue of seller j it is
necessary and sufﬁcient to know the second highest type visiting if there are at least two
visitors; otherwise one needs to know whether a visit occurred at all. Using Lemma 1,
the probability that any given buyer visits seller j, the seller with the jth lowest reserve











Let Mj denote the distribution function of the type of a buyer conditional on visiting















and then using this procedure one can calculate Mj for all x ≥ tj−1. By construction,
Mj(tj−1) = 0, since types lower than tj−1 do not visit seller j.L e t  Mj denote the distrib-
ution function of the second order statistics of buyer types that visit, setting it to zero if
fewer than two buyers visited. Then for all x ≥ tj−1,













To explain this formula, note that the probability that no buyer visits is (1 − Pj)n,a n d
the probability that one buyer visits is nPj(1 − Pj)n−1. In both cases the second order
statistic is set to zero. If there are l ≥ 2 buyers that visit, then the probability that the
second highest type is less than x i sg i v e ni nt h eb r a c k e t sa b o v e .L e t  mj(x) denote the
derivative of   Mj at x. Using the above calculations, one can write seller j’s expected
revenue for any small deviation that still leaves him with the jth lowest reserve:
Rj = (1−Pj)n ∗0+nPj(1−Pj)n−1rj +
  a+1
tj−1
x  mj(x)dx  (2)
4This assumption is only for expositional purposes. If it does not hold, then the whole exercise can
be done the same way except that one needs to handle the case of a small increase and a small decrease
separately to show that continuity is sustained in both directions.246 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
This revenue formula is a simple consequence of the second-price auction format. If no
buyer visits, the revenue is zero; if one visits, then it is rj; if several visit, then the revenue
is equal to the second highest bid (which is equal to the second highest type).
Inspecting formula (2), it is clear that the expected revenue is continuous in the re-
serve prices and cutoff types, because functions Pj and   mj(x) do not depend directly
on the reserve prices and depend continuously on the cutpoints. We have already ar-
gued that cutoff types are unique and continuous in reserves. Let us then take the game
among the sellers, taking as given that the buyers play the unique symmetric equilib-
rium in their stage game. This deﬁnes revenue functions for the sellers only in terms of
reserve prices, once one substitutes in the cutoff types in the revenue formula. Given
our continuity results, one can conclude that the revenues in this game are continu-
ous in the decision variables, the reserve prices. The following lemma summarizes this
discussion.
Lemma 2. The expected revenue of seller j is continuous in the reserve prices posted.
Also, each seller posts a reserve price rj in the compact, convex set [0 a+1].T h e r e -
fore, standard existence results (appealing to Glicksberg’s ﬁxed-point theorem) imply
that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the sellers’ game,5 and thus our
entire game has an equilibrium where the buyers follow symmetric strategies. The fol-
lowing corollary recaps our discussion.
Corollary 1. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the buyers follow sym-
metric strategies.
Before proceeding to our main result, it is useful to further characterize how the cut-
off types respond to changes in the reserve prices. The result below establishes that the
cutoffs are continuously differentiable in the reserve prices as long as all reserve prices
are different.
Lemma 3. If no two reserve prices are equal, then at point (r1 r2     rk) t h ec u t o f ft y p e s
and the expected revenues are continuously differentiable functions of the reserve prices.
Moreover, if rj  = rl for all l  = j, then at that point the cutoff types and expected revenues
are continuously differentiable functions of rj and the partial derivative with respect to
rj is also continuous in rl for all l  = j.I f rj = rl for some l  = j, then right hand partial
derivativesandlefthandpartialderivativesofthecutofftypesandexpectedrevenueswith
respect to rj still exist.
To prove this result we ﬁrst note that any cutoff type tj is indifferent between visiting
sellerj−1andj.T h i sg i v e su sk−1indifferenceconditionsink−1unknowns,thecutoff
values. We are able to exploit the special structure of these conditions to show that one
can use the implicit function theorem to obtain the desired conclusion. The logic of the
5See Lemma 7 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 247
exercise does not allow us to handle the case where the reserve prices are not all differ-
ent, since in this case slightly increasing or slightly decreasing the reserve price would
change a seller’s ranking, and then the whole set of equations would need to be rewrit-
ten to reﬂect this change in the ranking. Indeed, one can show that differentiability fails
at a point (r1 r2     rk) where rl = rm for m  = l, but left hand and right hand derivatives
w i t hr e s p e c tt oa l lr e s e r v ep r i c e se x i s t .I ti sa l s ou s e f u lt op o i n to u tt h a tg i v e nt h en a t u r e
of the problem, the utility function of the buyers u also satisﬁes similar differentiability
properties.
With these results in hand we are ready to consider our main question, that is,
whether the equilibria of games with a ﬁnite number of players converge (as the market
size becomes large) to the equilibrium of the inﬁnite game where all sellers post a zero
reserve price. We prove that such a convergence result indeed holds. The proof follows
our intuitive argument in the Introduction. We ﬁrst show that as the market grows large,
each seller loses his effect on the equilibrium utilities of the buyers. Then we conclude
the proof by showing that serving an extra type has a nonvanishing positive effect on
total welfare, which is thus captured by the seller as revenue in the limit.
Theorem 1. Take a sequence of games where liml→∞kl nl =∞and for all l we have
nl/kl ≤ ρ for some ρ>0. Then for any sequence of equilibria where the buyers use sym-
metric strategies, the reserve prices posted by the sellers converge to zero in distribution.
Proof. Take a sequence of games characterized by the number of sellers kl and the
numberofbuyers nl,andassumethat kl nl →∞as l →∞. Denotetheupperendofthe
support of the equilibrium strategies of seller i by dl
i and denote the distribution func-
tion of the equilibrium reserve prices6 by Hl
i. Note that it is without loss of generality to
assume that it is a best response to post reserve price dl
i, because the game between the
sellers is continuous in the reserve prices. In the main text we provide the proof only for
a simpler case (Case 1), relegating the more complicated case (Case 2) to the Appendix.
Case 1. First, assume that the equilibrium reserve price distribution does not put
positive probability on dl





i(x) = 1 
The proof is presented in steps. In Step 1 we show that it is sufﬁcient to establish
that the seller with the highest strictly positive reserve price always wants to decrease
his reserve if the market is large enough. In Step 2 we introduce a useful lemma and
reformulate our problem. In Step 3 we provide an upper bound to the sensitivity of
buyer utilities to a slight change in the action of the seller with the highest reserve price.
In Step 4 we show that if the market is large enough, then it is proﬁtable for the seller
with the highest reserve to decrease his reserve price, which concludes the proof.
Step 1.L e tm(l) ∈{ 1 2     kl} be such that dl
m(l) ≥ dl
j for all j. For our purposes it
is sufﬁcient to show that liml→∞dl
m(l) = 0 for any sequence of equilibria, because this
6The language of the proof implicitly assumes that we have a mixed strategy equilibrium, but the case of
pure strategies is covered in Case 2 in the Appendix.248 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
would prove that all equilibria get close to all sellers posting a zero reserve price as the
market becomes large. Our starting point is that (under the assumption for Case 1) by
posting a reserve price dl
m(l), seller m(l) posts a higher reserve price than all other sellers
withprobability1. Toestablishtheconclusionofthetheorem,Steps2–4belowshowthat
for any strictly positive reserve price ri, there exists a threshold  l(ri) such that if ri >r j for
all j  = i and l>  l(ri), then seller i can increase his proﬁt by slightly decreasing his reserve
price. Intuitively, thisimplies thatseller m(l) whoposts dl
m(l), hasaproﬁtabledownward
deviation if l is large enough, which contradicts with the assumption that dl
m(l) is in the
support of the strategy of seller m(l).
The rest of Step 1 formalizes the italicized statement above and shows that this
statement is sufﬁcient to conclude that liml→∞dl
m(l) = 0 indeed holds. Let r−i =




j(rj) denote the distribution function
of the equilibrium reserve prices posted by the other sellers, and let Rl
i(r1     rkl) be
the (expected) revenue of seller i in market l if the vector of reserve prices posted is
(r1     rkl). Note that formula Rl
i(r1     rkl) is well deﬁned for any market size l by the






i(r1     rkl)dGl
−i
denote the expected revenue of seller i in market l if he posts reserve price ri.B y
Lemma 3, Rl
i is continuously differentiable with respect to ri if ri >r j for all j  = i. Fixing
the market size l and the strategies of the other sellers, the derivative of the expected
revenue of seller i c a nb ew r i t t e na s
 
[0 a+1]kl−1 ∂Rl
i(r1     rkl)/∂ridGl
−i.
Toformalizetheitalicizedstatement,supposethatforallri > 0,ther eexists  l(ri)such




i(r1     rkl)<0  (3)
Then it follows that if i = m(l) and ri = dl
m(l) > 0,a n dl>  l(ri) then
 
[0 a+1]kl−1 ∂Rl
i(r1     
rkl)/∂ridGl
−i < 0 and thus ∂ERl
i(rl
i)/∂rl
i < 0. Therefore, if l>  l(ri) holds, then it is prof-
itable for seller m(l) to decrease his reserve price from ri. Since this statement is true for
any ri > 0, therefore liml→∞dl
m(l) = 0 must hold; otherwise seller m(l) has no incentive
to post reserve price dl
m(l), which contradicts with our starting assumption that dl
m(l) is
in the support of the strategy of seller m(l).
Step 2. The rest of the proof (Steps 2–4) ﬁnds an appropriate threshold value  l for
any value of ri such that (3) holds under the conditions stated before (3). For the rest of
the proof, assume without loss of generality that r1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤rk−2 ≤ rk−1 <r k <a+ 1,
i.e., we assume that m(l) = kl for all l. Moreover, we will not indicate superscript l if its
omission doesnot createconfusion. ByLemma3, Rk is continuously differentiablewith
respect to rk in this case. The following useful lemma helps our analysis.
Lemma 4. If r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ··· ≤ rk−2 ≤ rk−1 <r k <a+ 1, then we have ∂tk−1/∂rk > 0,
∂tk−2/∂rk > 0, and for any x ≥ tk−2, we have ∂u(x)/∂rk ≤ 0.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 249
The above lemma implies that one can take tk−1 as the decision variable of seller k,
since tk−1 is one-to-one with rk if one ﬁxes r−i. Letting
  Ri(tk−1) =
k
n
Ri(r1     rk(tk−1)) 
given Lemma 4, inequality (3) is equivalent to inequality ∂  Ri(tk−1)/∂tk−1 < 0. However,
it is more useful to establish the stronger condition that for some negative α,w eh a v e
∂
∂tk−1
  Ri(tk−1) ≤ α<0  (4)
The main advantage of establishing the stronger condition (4)i st h a tu n d e r( 4)i ti ss u f -
ﬁcient to cover the simplest case where r1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤rk−2 <r k−1 <r k holds, i.e., where
the two largest reserve prices are posted by a single seller. To see this, note that by


















is continuous in rk−2. Therefore, if one increases rk−2 until rk−2 = rk−1,i tm u s tb es t i l l
true that ∂  Ri(tk−1)/∂tk−1 ≤ α<0.
The rest of the proof (Steps 3 and 4) establishes that for all rk > 0,t h e r ee x i s t s  l(rk)
suchthatif l>  l(rk)andr1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤rk−2 <r k−1 <r k,then(4)holds,whichissufﬁcient
to establish the desired conclusion by the above discussion.
Step 3. In this step we characterize the change in utilities of the buyers who visit
seller i = m(l) if seller i reduces tk−1 slightly by reducing his reserve price slightly from









The formula (5) is the key step in the argument, as it implies that the utility effect of
a single seller vanishes in large markets. Formula (5) is formally proven as Lemma 5 in
the Appendix, but given its signiﬁcance, the rest of Step 3 goes through the main steps
of the argument in an informal manner. The formal proof is somewhat involved as it
involves the function u(x), for which there is no simple explicit formula. To tackle the
difﬁculties, we follow an indirect method. Instead of directly characterizing the utility
changes of types who visit seller k (i.e., types above tk−1), we characterize the changes
in the utility of those types who visit seller k−1 but not seller k, i.e., types between tk−2
and tk−1. This indirect method has the advantage that one does not need to calculate
how sensitive the cutoff types are to a change in rk, a calculation that involves a compli-
cated system of equations in k − 1 variables. For types on interval [tk−2 tk−1] who visit
seller k − 1, the relevant reserve price rk−1 is unchanged, and thus their utility changes
only because of changes in tk−1 and tk−2. Moreover, for types close to (and above) tk−2,
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k−1. (Otherwise, the utility is close to zero anyway, since the second highest type visit-
ing seller k−1 is greater than tk−2, and thus a type close to tk−2 who pays an amount of
at least tk−2 obtains a utility level very closetozero.) The utility of a buyerwith valuation
x for the case when no other buyer visits seller k − 1 can be written as the probability
that no other buyer visits seller k−1 times his surplus x−rk−1 in this case. Formally, the













The derivative of this expression with respect to tk−1 depends on how tk−2 responds to
ac h a n g ei ntk−1. Fortunately, our analysis only uses the fact that ∂tk−2/∂tk−1 ≥ 0,w h i c h















yields an upper bound to how big the utility effect can be for a type x, which is close to
tk−2.8 Then one can use the envelope theorem to estimate the utility changes for all the
types who visit seller k, i.e., types greater than tk−1. The details are in the Appendix.
Step 4. Therestoftheproofformalizesthekeyintuitionoftheproof, i.e., weformally
show that the beneﬁt from increasing participation remains positive, while the utility
costs tend to zero and therefore it is beneﬁcial for the seller with the highest reserve
price to decrease his reserve. We ﬁrst calculate the expected revenue of seller k as the
total surplus generated at seller k minus the total utilities of the types visiting seller k.
For all x ≥ tk−1,l e tG(x) denote the probability that seller k sells to a buyer with type
less than x or does not sell at all. This event happens if and only if no buyer with type
greater than x visits seller k,a n dt h u sG(x) = (1−(1−F(x))/k)n. Letting g(x)= ∂G/∂x,





Since such types visit seller k with probability 1/k, it follows that the sum of utilities















8Note, that the partial derivative with respect to tk−1 (ignoring the effect through the change in tk−2)
converges to zero if (n−1)/(k(k−1)) converges to zero. This suggests that the utility effect vanishes in the
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Then the expected revenue is Rk = Wk −Ck and one can assume that seller k maximizes









































































































 ρ + α
maxx f(x)
  (8)
Therefore, for all rk > 0,i fl is large enough such that (8) holds and r1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤
rk−2 <r k−1 <r k,t h e n( 4) holds, which concludes the proof for Case 1 as we indicated
in Step 2.
Case 2. Now, assume that the equilibrium bid distribution may put positive proba-
bility on dl





Hl(x) = 1 
The formal proof for this case is given in the Appendix. The idea behind the proof is
the same as in Case 1: the utility effect of any seller vanishes in the limit. Then each
seller maximizes the total surplus created at his store, which is achieved by selling the
object if any buyer visits at all. The main technical complications compared to Case 1252 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
are twofold. First, when a seller with the highest reserve considers a deviation down-
ward, he will no longer be the seller with the highest reserve price if other sellers posted
the exact same reserve price that he did before the deviation. Therefore, the deviating
seller’s proﬁt can be described in a more complicated manner that depends on the last
two cutpoints, and not only the last one. One then needs to calculate how both of those
cutpoints respond to a change in the reserve price, which complicates the analysis sub-
stantially. The second, and more major, complication is that now the number of sellers
q who posted the very highest reserve price (in a “tie”) can take any numbers between
1 and k,w h e r ek becomes large as the market becomes large. We need to distinguish
different cases, depending on whether q is large or small compared to k as the market
grows large, and we need to show that a uniform bound (that is now independent of not
only the reserve prices posted by the other seller, but also of q)e x i s t s . 
Using the above argument one can also show that the rate of convergence is fairly
quick under our assumptions. Inspecting formula (8), which is valid in Case 1, suggests
that the upper end of the equilibrium reserve price distribution r satisﬁes if r<D /kfor
someconstant D. TheProofforCase2intheAppendixshowsthatthisresultholdsthere
as well. Therefore, the posted reserve prices must converge to zero in distribution at the
fast rate of 1/kunder our assumption that n/k ≤ ρ for all markets l.9
ItisappropriateheretocompareourresultswiththoseofHernando-Veciana(2005),
who considers a convergence result as well. The main difference is that he assumes that
the sellers are restricted to a ﬁnite grid that includes production costs. This assumption
leads to a pure strategy equilibrium for a large enough (but ﬁnite!) market size where all
sellers post a reserve price equal to their production costs. The discrete grid also allows
him to consider the case where sellers have heterogeneous production costs, a case that
is not formally studied here.10 A further major difference between Hernando-Veciana
(2005) and our paper is that when the market becomes large, he assumes that the ratios
of buyers to sellers are ﬁxed, while we allow it to change as long as in the limit the ratio
of buyers to sellers remains bounded. Finally, we are able to study a pure strategy equi-
librium for ﬁnite markets (see Section 3), which is not possible using the large market
approximationsofHernando-Veciana(2005). Inparticular,wegivesufﬁcientconditions
forwhensuchanequilibriumexistsand,ifitdoes,whatthespeedofconvergenceis,and
we also show interesting comparative statics results.
9If one lifts this assumption, then it is our conjecture that convergence also holds (at a rate possibly
slower than 1/k) under the weaker condition that liml→∞(nl −1)/(kl(kl −1)) = 0, but a proof is unavail-
able. We seein the nextsection that this condition is sufﬁcient in the case when a pure strategyequilibrium
exists.
10While a formal analysis of the heterogeneous cost case is beyond the scope of this work, the logic
behind Theorem 1 extends to this case to some extent. More precisely, our proof can be directly adapted to
show that the seller with the highest cost (also the one with the highest reserve price) must post a reserve
price that converges to his cost of production as the market becomes large. However, a convergence result
for sellers with lower cost levels does not follow directly.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 253
3. Symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
In this section we study whether an equilibrium exist for a given f, n, k, a, where sellers
usepurestrategies, andcharacterizesuchanequilibriumifitexists,providingcompara-
tive statics and convergence results. Burguet and Sákovics (1999) establishes that when
a = 0 and there are k = 2 sellers, such a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. For
reasons of tractability, we concentrate on symmetric pure strategy equilibria, where the
sellers play symmetric and pure strategies all posting reserve price r ≥ 0.( T h e b u y e r s
are assumed to use symmetric strategies as before.) In what follows we assume that
r ≤ a in equilibrium and thus all types are served.11 The following result characterizes
such an equilibrium when it exists and provides a necessary second order condition for
existence.
Theorem 2. There is at most one symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the game. In




A necessary condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that





Proof. Suppose that all other sellers post reserve price r and seller 1 deviates to r1.12
First, take the case where r1 >r.B yLemma 1, the unique symmetric Bayesian equilib-
rium in the buyers’ stage game is such that types less than y visit sellers 2 through k with
equalprobabilityandtypesabovey visitallksellerswithequalprobability. ByLemma4,
y and r1 are one-to-one, so the deviating seller’s problem can be written using decision
variable y instead of r1.
Next, note that type y has the same probability of winning at any seller; this prob-
ability is (1 − (1−F(y))/k). At seller 1,t y p ey wins if and only if all the other buyers
visited other sellers and his payment is r1 conditional on winning. Therefore, the ex-
pected payment of type y at seller 1 is (1 − (1−F(y))/k)r1.I ft y p ey visits seller j  = 1,
then he wins if and only if all the other buyers have visited a seller other than j or those
visiting j h a v et y p e sl e s st h a ny. If no one else visited j,t h e nb u y e ri pays r, and if l other
buyers visited j, then the expected payment is the expected value of the highest type
among the l buyers conditional on them all having types less than y (otherwise buyer i
does not win). Let Em(l) denote this expected value when l other buyers visited.
11One can show that there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium where r>aholds. Moreover, our
conjecture is that a pure strategy equilibrium with asymmetric reserve prices does not exist, but a proof is
unavailable.
12Thecalculationsbelowcanbeobtainedasaspecialcaseofour ﬁrsttwonumberedformulas. However,
we ﬁnd it more instructive to simplify the analysis by using that all other sellers post the same reserve price,
and we derive the revenue formula from “scratch.”254 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Since his probability of winning is the same whether he visited seller 1 or j  = 1,t h e









































(1 − (1−F(y))/k − F(y)/(k−1))n−l ×
(F(y)/(k − 1))l−1Em(l−1) as an expected value of a random variable. Let τ take value
zero when there is no other buyer at seller j  = 1; otherwise let τ take the highest type
among the other buyers who visited j. Let function ρ(z) = z if z ≤ y and let ρ(z) = 0 if
z>y .T h e n ϕ is the expected value of random variable ρ(τ). Letting t be the density




























Now, we describe the expected revenue of seller 1. The revenue of seller 1 is equal
to r1 if exactly one buyer visited him and equal to zero if no buyer did. If more than
two buyers visited him, then the revenue is equal to the value of the second highest
type. Therefore, the expected revenue from having l ≥ 2 buyers visit is equal to Es(l),t h e
expected value of the second highest type conditional on all buyers having types above
y (otherwise they would have visited other sellers). With this shorthand notation, the
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Now, let r1 <r. In this case the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the buy-
ers’ stage game is such that types less than x visit seller 1 and types above x visit all k










A similar analysis as above yields that inducing x ∈[ a a+1] yields an expected revenue
of

























The optimality condition for the seller has two parts. First, it requires that he should
not have an incentive to increase his reservation price above r, which is equivalent to
requiring that a ∈ argmaxy≥aR1(y), since choosing y>ain terms of cutoffs is equiv-
alent to choosing a reserve price greater than r. The corresponding ﬁrst order con-
dition is ∂R1/∂y|y=a ≤ 0, which is equivalent to r ≥ (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2),a f t e r
making the necessary calculations. Second, it requires that he should not have an
incentive to choose a reserve price less than r, which is equivalent to requiring that
a ∈ argmaxx≥a   R1(x), since choosing x>ain terms of cutoffs is equivalent to choosing
a reserve price less than r. The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is ∂  R1/∂x|x=a ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to r ≤ (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2), after making the necessary cal-
culations. Hence, the ﬁrst order condition(s) uniquely pins down the reserve price at
r = (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2). For the local second order conditions, we need that256 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
when we let r = (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2), the second derivatives of R1 and   R1 are
nonpositive at y = a and x = a, respectively. The second derivative of R1 at y = a is non-
positive if af (a) ≥ a∗, while that of   R1 at x = a is nonpositive for all values of a and f(a).
(TheAppendix contains the details of the calculus.) 
The above result adds a few important insights that are not possible to draw when
a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. First, Theorem 2 implies that as the number
of sellers (buyers) increases, the sellers post lower (higher) equilibrium reserve prices to
competeeffectively. Thisresultshowsthatmarketforcesworkintheintuitivedirections.
Second, the theorem also shows that the equilibrium reserve price decreases in the size
of the market due to the fact that each seller has less effect on the equilibrium utility
levels of the buyers and thus increasing his reserve price becomes less appealing for
each seller. To see how the market size effect works, let (n−1)/(k−1) = β be ﬁxed and





which is decreasing in market size (represented by k in this formula as β is held ﬁxed).
Third, one is able to obtain a rate of convergence that turns out to be quite high. To
see this, assume again that (n−1)/(k−1) = β is held ﬁxed and note that in this case
the posted reserve price converges to zero at rate 1/k. Fourth, one is able to relax the
assumption of Hernando-Veciana (2005) that the ratio of buyers to sellers is constant.
More precisely, Theorem 2 shows that if lim(n−1)/(k−1)2 = 0, then the equilibrium
reserve price converges to zero, even if the ratio of buyers to sellers (n/k) converges to
inﬁnity. However, if the ratio of buyers to sellers converges to inﬁnity fast enough, then
convergence does not occur, since the sellers try to take advantage of the large number
of buyers by posting high reserve prices. Fifth, it may be interesting to see how the re-
sults changewhen thesellersareknown tohavelowervaluations thanthebuyers, acase
that was mostly neglected by the previous literature. Sixth, our result also shows that
if a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, then the equilibrium reserve price de-
pendsonly onthenumberofbuyersandsellers, andthelowestpossiblevaluationofthe
buyers, but not on the distribution of valuations.13 Finally, it is interesting to point out
that as the market becomes large, we have a∗ → 0 if the ratio of buyers to sellers is ﬁxed,
and thus for any (ﬁxed) positive values of a and f(a), the local second order condition
af (a) ≥ a∗ is satisﬁed in the limit. This suggests that as the market becomes large, it is
more likely that there is a pure strategy equilibrium. According to our conjecture (see
below), for any convex distribution function F and a>0 (the gap case), there exists a
pure strategy equilibrium if the market is large enough. It is also interesting to point out
that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then the equilibrium is ex post efﬁcient. The
reason is that efﬁciency dictates trade to occur, and the equilibrium allocation is such
13The reason is that as a seller changes his reserve price from r, the change in the cutoff type t1 depends
only on n, k, r, a, and f(a). Therefore, the revenue of the deviator may depend only on those variables, but
variable f(a)cancels out (at least for the ﬁrst order condition) when the calculations are actually made.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 257
that trade always occurs as long as at least one buyer visited a certain seller, since r<a
holds.14
The above results are, of course, conditional on theexistence of a pure strategy equi-
librium. Itisimportanttounderstandwhensuchanequilibriumexistsandwhenitdoes
not. In what follows we provide an explicit sufﬁcient condition that is not, however, on
the primitives of the model except for the case of two buyers. After the formal result be-
low, we discuss our conjectures about when those sufﬁcient conditions may hold in the
g e n e r a lc a s eo fm o r et h a nt w ob u y e r s .
Before the formal result, we provide a discussion that shows why the second order
condition of seller optimization may hold in this model, although it always fails in the
setup of Burguet and Sákovics (1999). Our starting point is that as Burguet and Sákovics
(1999) have already pointed out the ﬁrst order conditions are not sufﬁcient for seller
optimization, and this is the cause for nonexistence of pure strategy equilibrium when
a = 0. Indeed, when a = 0 t h ec a s es t u d i e db yBurguet and Sákovics (1999), the localsec-
ond order condition fails and a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. In
ourmodelwith a largeenough, thisproblemdoesnotarise, becausewithahighenough
level of a we have ∂2R1/∂y2|y=a ≤ 0. In less technical terms, the key is to study the incen-
tives to increase the reserve price slightly from r when all the other sellers posted r.A s
a seller changes his reserve price from r, the change in the cutoff type t1 depends only
on f(a), but not theentire distribution of types F. Therefore, the revenue of thedeviator
may depend only on f(a), but not on function F.I tt u r n so u tt h a tf(a)cancels out in
the ﬁrst order condition as a balance of two effects. On one hand, the higher f(a)is,
the more costly it is to lose visits from types less than t1 for any ﬁxed value of t1.O nt h e
other hand, the higher f(a)is, the less the cutoff t1 is inﬂuenced by the reserve price.
These two effects are equally important, and thus f(a)does not have a ﬁrst order effect
on how the revenue changes when r1 changes. But the density f(a)does not cancel out
in the second order condition. Moreover, the more buyers have types close to a (i.e., the
higher f(a)is) and the higher a is, the more costly it is to lose visits from types close to a,
and therefore the more likely that increasing ones reserve price is not proﬁtable. This
intuition is conﬁrmed formally in the above proof leading to formula (9). Therefore, if
a and f(a)are large enough, then the second order conditions hold at r1 = r,a n do n e
only needs to make sure that the second order condition (9) (together with the ﬁrst or-
der condition) is sufﬁcient to rule out that any large deviation is proﬁtable. This is done
in the next corollary. More precisely, the following corollary provides a sufﬁcient condi-
tion for existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium and states a speciﬁc case in
which those conditions hold.
Corollary 2. A symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists if functions R1 and   R1 are
quasiconcaveforally ∈[ a a+1]andx ∈[ a a+1]whenr = (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2).
If the necessary conditions stated in Theorem 1 hold, n = 2,a n dF is convex, then there
exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
14This result is different from Burguet and Sákovics (1999), who study the case where a = 0 (with two
sellers) and show that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists where the reserve prices are positive with prob-
ability 1. Their result underlines that if a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, then ex post efﬁciency
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Proof.T h e ﬁ r s t p a r t o f Corollary 2 is a simple consequence of the above analysis. For
the n = 2 case, a simple substitution yields that ∂2R1/∂y2 and ∂2  R1/∂x2 are decreasing
functions for all y ∈[ a a + 1] and x ∈[ a a + 1] when r = (n−1)a/((n−1)+(k−1)2)
and F is convex. Therefore, the local second order conditions at y = a and x = a are
sufﬁcient globally. 
Unfortunately, a satisfactory sufﬁcient condition stated on the primitives is only
available in the not very interesting special case where there are two buyers (n = 2).
For this reason, we conducted numerical calculations, and obtained the conjecture that
convexity of F seems to be sufﬁcient for a pure strategy equilibrium to exists (for any
n, k) as long as the local second order condition in Theorem 2 is satisﬁed.15 More pre-
cisely, using Mathematica we were not able to ﬁnd any cases with F convex where the
global sufﬁcient conditions (R1 and   R1 being quasiconcave) fail. Since functions R1 and
  R1 are highly complicated polynomial functions involving high order powers of F and r,
a proof to support our conjecture remains unavailable.
4. Conclusion
Our contribution to the literature on competing auctions is twofold. First, we analyze
the case of large markets and show that as the market becomes large, the utility effect of
each single seller approaches zero. Therefore, as long as his reserve price is larger than
his cost, it is strictly proﬁtable for each seller to attract extra buyers by decreasing his
reserve price. Hence in large markets, we prove that the sellers post reserve prices close
to their production costs. Second, we provide conditions under which a pure strategy
equilibrium exists and provide explicit solutions for the case of ﬁnite markets. This al-
lowsustoobtainintuitive comparativestaticsresults, showing thatifthenumbersellers
(buyers)increases,thentheequilibriumreservepricegoesdown(up),andasthemarket
size increases, the equilibrium reserve price decreases.
Appendix
Proofs of Lemmas 1, 3, and 4. Proving that any equilibria can be characterized by
suchcutoffvaluesasstatedinLemma1isastraightforwardextensionoftheproofforthe
case of two sellers as covered in Burguet and Sákovics (1999) ,a n di st h u so m i t t e d .T h e
other results are proved in the following order. We ﬁrst prove the content of Lemma 3.
The uniqueness part of Lemma 1 then follows from that proof almost immediately. At
the end of the proof, we cover Lemma 4.
Note, that to prove Lemma 3 we need only to prove continuous differentiability of
the cutoff types with respect to the reserves, since the revenue functions are contin-
uously differentiable in the reserve prices and the cutoff types as formula (2)i nt h e
15Itiseasytoprovideexampleswithadecreasingdensityfunctionwherethereisaproﬁtableglobaldevi-
ation and thus a regular equilibrium does not exist. This is not very surprising, since when f is decreasing,
the virtual utilities may be nonmonotone, in which case losing visits from higher types may be less costly
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main text implies. Let us calculate how the cutoff types are calculated given a reserve
price vector (r1 r2     rk), again assuming that 0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤rk ≤ a + 1.F i r s t
note that type tk−1 is indifferent between visiting sellers 1 and 2.A l s o , b y c o n s t r u c -
tion, he wins with the same probability at the two sellers. To see this, note that since
tk−1 is the lowest type visiting seller k, he wins there if and only if there is no other
buyer visiting, i.e., with probability (1 − Pk)n−1. At seller k − 1, he wins if and only
if either no other buyer visits or if the other buyer with the highest type that visits is
less than tk−1. This occurs with probability (1 −Pk−1 +(F(tk−1)−F(tk−2))/(k−1))n−1,
since by Lemma 1 at y p eb e l o wtk−1 visits seller k − 1 i fh i st y p ei sa b o v etk−2 and
the probability of a visit is 1/(k − 1) in this case. As formula (1) implies, Pk−1 =
Pk + (F(tk−1)−F(tk−2))/(k−1), and thus the two winning probabilities are equal:
(1−Pk)n−1 = (1−Pk−1 +(F(tk−1)−F(tk−2))/(k−1))n−1.
Therefore, the indifference condition of type t1 implies that such a buyer type has
to make the same expected payment at the two sellers. At seller k, the expected pay-
ment conditional on winning is simply rk, since that type pays only if no other buyer
is present and the payment is equal to the reserve price. At seller k − 1, the formula is
more complicated. The payment is rk−1 if no other buyer is present, but it is higher if
competing buyers are present. If h other buyers are present, then the expected payment
is equal to the ﬁrst order statistics of h types that are i.i.d. on [tk−2 tk−1] with distribu-
tion function F.L e tv1
k−1 denote the highest other type that visits seller k − 1,a n ds e t
v1
k−1 equal to zero if no other buyer visits. Then the expected payment conditional on
winning at seller k − 1 is equal to E[max{rk−1 v1
k−1}|v1
k−1 ≤ tk−1] and the indifference
condition becomes
rk = E[max{rk−1 v1
k−1}|v1
k−1 ≤ tk−1]  (14)
This equation involves only two cutoff type values, tk−1 and tk−2. To see this, note that
the above equation involves only the probability distribution of v1
k−1, which we denote




max{rk−1 x}d k−1(x)  (15)
To describe the distribution function  k−1, note that its support is rk−1 ∪[ tk−2 tk−1]
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if x ∈[ tk−2 tk−1)
1 if x ≥ tk−1.
This distribution function depends only on tk−1, tk−2, and the reserve prices, since
Pk and Pk−1 are only functions of tk−1 and tk−2. Therefore, equation (15) involves only260 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
those two variables. Denoting the right hand side of (15)b yβk−1 this equation can be
rewritten as
βk−1(tk−1 tk−2 rk−1) = rk 
We now proceed to show that ∂βk−1/∂tk−2 < 0, ∂βk−1/∂tk−1 > 0, and thus the implicit
function theorem can be used to describe tk−2 as a continuously differentiable func-
tion of tk−1 a n da l s ot oc o n c l u d et h a t∂tk−2/∂tk−1 > 0. First, we show that ∂βk−1/
∂tk−2 < 0. To establish this, we show that a change in tk−2 causes a ﬁrst order stochas-
tic dominant change in distribution function  k−1. To see this, note that  k−1(rk−1) =
((1−Pk −(F(tk−1)−F(tk−2))/(k−1))/(1−Pk))n−1 is a decreasing function of tk−2.
















Let   tk−2 >t k−2 denote two possible values of the (k − 2)nd cutpoint. Then since the
formula (16) does not depend on tk−2, we must have for all x ∈[   tk−2 tk−1) the two dis-
tribution functions are equal:
   k−1(x) =  k−1(x) 


















=   k−1(rk−1) 
Also, by strict monotonicity of  k−1 on [tk−2   tk−2] it follows that for all x on thatinterval,
 k−1(x) <  k−1(  tk−2) =   k−1(  tk−2) =   k−1(x) 
where the ﬁrst equality follows because the right hand side of (16) does not depend
on the (k − 2)nd cutpoint, while the second inequality follows from the fact that
when the (k − 2)nd cutoff takes value   tk−2, then no buyer with type lower than   tk−2
visits. Putting all these observations together implies that  k−1 ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates    k−1 and thus βk−1(tk−1 tk−2 rk−1) =
  tk−1
a max{rk−1 x}d k−1(x) >
βk−1(tk−1   tk−2 rk−1) =
  tk−1
a max{rk−1 x}d   k−1(x). Moreover, it is routine to establish
that βk−1 is differentiable in its second component and that its derivative is always
strictly negative.
Now, we show that ∂βk−1/∂tk−1 > 0. For this, it is sufﬁcient to show that  k−1 is
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is clearly decreasing in tk−1. A similar argument shows that (1 − Pk−1 + (F(x) −
F(tk−2))/(k−1))/(1−Pk) is decreasing as well, which concludes this step and shows
that given the reserve prices and tk−1, there is a unique cutoff tk−2 that is a candidate for
an equilibrium in the buyers’ stage game. Moreover, tk−2 is a differentiable function of
tk−1 and ∂tk−2/∂tk−1 > 0.
Now, one can write the indifference conditions corresponding to cutoff type tk−2.
This condition involves only three endogenous variables: tk−3, tk−2,a n dtk−1.T oc o m -









> 0  (17)
These inequalities together with the property of the implicit function from the previ-
ous step ∂tk−2/∂tk−1 > 0 imply that one can again use the implicit function theorem to
describetk−3 asafunctionoftk−1 andalsothat∂tk−3/∂tk−1 > 0. Theproofoftheinequal-
ities in (17) again follows after establishing stochastic dominance of the distribution of
the ﬁrst order statistics. The distribution of the ﬁrst order statistics can be written as
 k−2(x) =
⎧
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if x ∈[ tk−3 tk−2)
1 if x ≥ tk−2.
It takes almost an identical argument as above to show that  k−2 is increasing in
tk−3 and then ﬁrst order stochastic dominance implies that, indeed, ∂βk−2/∂tk−3 < 0.
Establishing that ∂βk−2/∂tk−1 ∂ βk−2/∂tk−2 > 0 is done by a slight modiﬁcation of the
proof in the ﬁrst step (for function  k−1).
Iterating the above arguments, one can use k − 2 indifference conditions corre-
sponding to cutoffs tk−1 tk−2     t3 t2. This procedure yields that all the cutoff values
tk−2 tk−3     t2 t1 can be expressed as a continuously differentiable function of tk−1
with ∂tj/∂tk−1 > 0 for all j = 1 2     k−2. Then one can use the indifference condition
corresponding to type t1 to obtain that
β1(t1 t2     tk−1 r1 r2     rk−1 rk) = r1 




Substituting the implicit functions for lower cutoff types (as a function of tk−1), one can
rewrite the above equation as
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Then by the above results, ∂  β1/∂tk−1 > 0 holds and the implicit function theorem can be
used to obtain a continuously differentiable function tk−1(r1 r2     rk). Then using the
previous function, one can obtain continuously differentiable functions tj(r1 r2     rk)
for all j = 1 2     k−2 as well. This concludes the proof of continuous differentiability
for the case where all reserves are different. Now, if two reserves are equal, rj = rj+1,
the above procedure does not guarantee that when we increase rj, the same derivatives
apply as when we decrease it. (Indeed this is not true in general!) Therefore, at those
points only right hand and left hand derivatives exist.
This proof also implies that since ∂  β1/∂tk−1 > 0, there exists a unique solution, and
thus a unique equilibrium cutoff vector exists for any vector of reserve prices. Moreover,
if rk >r k−1 and then if rk is slightly changed, then the ranking of the sellers remains un-
changedandthuscontinuousdifferentiabilityinrk intheclaimofLemma3followsfrom
the above argument. Continuity of the derivatives ∂tj/∂rk in ri, i  = k, j = 1 2     k− 1,
follows also from the above argument, since all the indifference conditions (the β func-
tions) are continuously differentiable in ri.
Finally, we prove the comparative statics results stated in Lemma 4 for the case
where rk >r k−1. Take two situations where the ﬁrst k−1 sellers have their reserve prices
ﬁxed and seller k considers choosing between rk and  rk. Variables without a tilde refer
tovariablesinthecasewhereseller k posts rk, whilevariableswithatilderefertothesit-
uations where seller k posts  rk. Supposing that  rk >r k and tk−1 >  tk−1 hold at the same
time, we establish a contradiction below. If seller k posts rk, then there are less buyers
visitingseller k andthereservepriceisalsolowercomparedtothesituationwhereseller
k posts  rk. Therefore, we must have
u(a+1)>  u(a+1) 
Let  (x) and    (x) be the probability that a buyer with type x obtains the object when
the reserve price is rk or  rk.16 The envelope theorem implies that
u (x) =  (x) (18)
and
  u (x) =    (x)  (19)
Since by assumption tk−1 >  tk−1, therefore for all the types x>t k−1,w eh a v e








since type x loses if and only if there is a higher type visiting seller k, which occurs with
the same probability in the two cases. Therefore, the last four formulas imply that
u(tk−1)>  u(tk−1)  (20)
16This probability is the same regardless of which seller a buyer with type x visits among his optimal
choices.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 263
Now, for the same reason as before, for all x ∈ (  tk−1 tk−1) we have




















because the probability that another buyer with type between x and tk−1 visits the same
seller as type x (seller k − 1)i s1/(k − 1). A simple comparison yields that    (x) >  (x),
and then (18), (19), and (20)i m p l y
u(  tk−1)>  u(  tk−1)  (21)
Now, suppose that  tk−2 >t k−2. Then a similar argument as above implies that for all
x ∈ (  tk−2   tk−1),w eh a v e   (x) >  (x) and thus  u (x) > u (x).T h e n( 21)i m p l i e st h a t
u(  tk−2)>  u(  tk−2)  (22)
By construction, it is optimal for type  tk−2 to visit seller k − 1 when seller k posts a re-
serve price of  rk. Also, since tk−1 >  tk−1 >  tk−2 >t k−2, it follows that it is optimal for type
  tk−2 to visit seller k − 1 when seller k posts a reserve price of rk. Let us compare u(  tk−2)
and   u(  tk−2) directly. Since  tk−2 >t k−2 and tk−1 >  tk−1, it follows that seller k − 1 is vis-
ited with a strictly lower probability when k posts  rk than when he posts rk,a n ds i m p l e
calculations show that we must have
u(  tk−2)<  u(  tk−2) 
since the reserve price posted by seller k−1 is unchanged.
But the last inequality contradicts (22)a n dt h u stk−2 >  tk−2 follows. Similar argu-
ments as before formula (21) then imply that
u(  tk−2)>  u(  tk−2) 
Proceeding iteratively one can show that for all j,w eh a v ef o ra l lj = 1 2     k−1,
tj >  tj (23)
and also that for all x,
u(x) >  u(x)  (24)
However, take a low type y ∈ (r1   t1) who visits seller 1 both when seller k posts rk and
when he posts  rk. It is easy to see that if the cutoff values decrease, then he is better off,
because seller 1 is visited with a lower probability. Therefore, (23)i m p l i e st h a t  u(y) >
u(y), which contradicts (24), establishing that ∂tk−1/∂rk > 0. The result that ∂tk−2/∂rk >
0 can be established by a similar iterative argument, which we omit. The claim that u(x)264 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
decreases in rk for all x ≥ tk−2 follows also from the envelope theorem and the iterative
construction employed. Given our other differentiability results, it follows that u(x) is
(continuously) differentiable in rk when rk is not equal to any other reserves. 








Proof.L e t  (x)denote the probability that type x is receiving an object. Since a type
x ∈ (tk−2 tk−1) visits seller k − 1, any of the other n − 1 buyers takes the object away
from a buyer with type x if this other buyer has a type between x and tk−1 and visits
seller k − 1 or has a type higher than tk−1 and visits seller k − 1. (In what follows, we do
notexplicitlyusethesuperscript l,butallelementsofstrategicinteraction k, n, t andthe
reserve prices depend on l.) Using Lemma 1, the ﬁrst possibility occurs with probabil-
ity (F(tk−1)−F(x))/(k−1), while the second occurs with probability (1−F(tk−1))/k.


















Therefore, considering the case where none of the other n − 1 buyers takes the object



































 n−1  (26)
which does not depend on tk−1.
Let x ∈ (tk−2 tk−1) and calculate the utility such a type achieves in equilibrium.
The probability that no other buyer visits seller k − 1 is ((k−1)/k + F(tk−2)/(k−1) −
F(tk−1)/(k(k−1)))n−1, in which case the buyer with type x pays rk−1 for the object,
which he wins for sure. The probability that g ∈{ 1 2     n− 1} other buyers visit




((k−1)/k + F(tk−2)/(k−1) −
F(tk−1)/(k(k−1)))n−1−g((F(x)−F(tk−2))/(k−1))g. In this case, the payment of a
buyer with type x is equal to the largest valuation among all the g − 1 other buyers whoTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 265






















































since tk−1 and rk are in a one-to-one relationship by Lemma 4) and let us calculate the
utility change of a type when seller k decreases his decision variable tk−1 slightly. One
needstoallowalltheothercutpointstochangetoaccommodatethechangein tk−1,an d
thus when derivatives are taken with respect to tk−1, these indirect effects are also taken








 n−2(F(x)−F(tk−2))(x−E[y | y ∈[ tk−2 x]])
 
∂tk−1






because F(x)−F(tk−2) = x−E[y | y ∈[ tk−2 x]] = 0 when x = tk−2. Thederivativesofthe
































































17When calculating the utility of type x (ﬁxed at the initial level of tk−2), we are using the fact that when
tk−1 decreases,then tk−2 decreasesaswell,soatype x thatisequaltotheinitialvalueof tk−2 stillvisitsseller
k−1.266 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)







































































































Using that ((k−1)/k + F(tk−2)/(k−1) − F(tk−1)/(k(k−1)))n−2 < 1,
  x
tk−2((k−1)/k +









Lemma 6. If q sellers post the highest reserve price rk, then if any single seller (seller k)o f


























  (30)Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 267
and that since type a + 1 visits the sellers who posted the highest reserve price and that
reserve price does not change when seller k decreases rk slightly, therefore u(a + 1)
changes only because tk−q+1 changes. Let us show now that ∂u(a+1)/∂tk−q+1 is uni-
formly bounded. To see this, let A(x) denote the probability that no other buyer with
type above x visits seller k − q + 1, the seller that the highest type, a + 1, visits with





































≤ ρf (tk−q+1) 







≤ 0  (31)
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Proof for Case 2 of Theorem 1. In Case 2 the main difference is that, with positive
probability, there may be q>1 sellers who post the highest reserve prices. The proof
belowestablishesexactlythatifthereareq>1sellerswhopostthehighestreserveprice,
then any of those q sellers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to decrease their reserve price. First, take
the case where q = k, i.e., all the other sellers post reserve price rk as well. As we show
subsequently in the Proof of Theorem 2, seller k has an incentive to decrease his reserve
price if rk >a ( n−1)/((n−1)+(k−1)2). But this threshold is approaching zero and
thus if the market is large enough, seller k has an incentive to decrease his price for any
positive rk.
Otherwise (if q<k ), let r1 ≤ r2 ≤···≤rk−q−1 <r k−q <r k−q+1 =···=rk <a+ 1 and
suppose that seller k decreases rk slightly. In this case, Lemma 1 implies that after
this change, seller k is visited with probability 1/(k−q +1) by types between tk−q and
tk−q+1, and visited with probability 1/k by types larger than tk−q+1.W h e n rk is at the
original level (and thus rk−q+1 =···=rk), then of course tk−q = tk−q+1,b u tw h e nrk is
decreased, then tk−q <t k−q+1. The following useful result helps the analysis below.18
Lemma 7. The cutoff values are differentiable in rk from the left hand side, i.e.,
lim
r rk
tj(r1 r2     rk)−tj(r1 r2     r)
rk −r
exists for j = 1 2     k−1. Moreover, for the left hand derivatives we have ∂tk−q/∂rk > 0,
∂tk−q−1/∂rk > 0,a n d∂tk−q+1/∂rk < 0. Moreover, for all x ≥ tk−q−1, we have
∂u(x)/rk < 0.
B e c a u s eo ft h ea b o v el e m m a ,i n s t e a do frk,o n ec a nt a k etk−q as the choice variable
of seller k.T a k e a b u y e r w i t h t y p e x that is equal to the original value of tk−q−1.F o r
that type it is optimal to visit seller k − q. Suppose that tk−q goes down and thus tk−q−1
goes down as well by the Lemma 7. Then for type x it is still optimal to visit seller k −q.

















We ﬁrst provide a uniform convergence result for the case where q is not too small.
For all x ≥ tk−q−1,l e tG(x) denote the probability that seller k sells to a buyer with type
less than x or does not sell at all, and let g(x)= ∂G/∂x denote the corresponding density
function. If x>t k−q+1, this event happens if and only if no buyer with type greater than












18T h eﬁ r s th a l fo ft h el e m m ai sad i r e c tc o n s e q u e n c eo fLemma 3. The proof of the second half is very
similar to that of Lemma 4 and is thus omitted.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 269
The expected revenue of seller k is the total surplus generated at seller k minus the total
utilities of the types visiting seller k or



















with probability 1/(k−q +1). It is useful to describe the utility cost in an alternative
way using the function u∗ that describes the utility of a type conditional on obtaining





Note that type tk−q obtains the object from seller k if and only if no other buyer visited















































































dx 270 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
We need to evaluate this derivative at the point where rk = rk−1 =···=rk−q+1 and thus
tk−q = tk−q+1 = t∗
k−q,w h e r et∗



















































Using that q>1 and ∂tk−q+1/∂tk−q ≤ 0 by Lemma 7 and formula (33) yields that
∂Rk
∂tk−q





































































































and thus for any value of k ≥ 2 and any reserve prices posted by the other k − q sellers
who did not post rk,i fq ≥ q∗ + 1, then seller k has an incentive to reduce his reserve
price.
Nextconsiderthecasewhere liml→∞q ≤ q∗ < ∞. Notethatinthiscaseitissufﬁcient
to show that the left hand derivative of Rk (when rk is maximal) is negative for all q ≤ q∗
if k>k (q), because then letting k = max{k(1) k(2)     k(q∗)} may serve as a uniformTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 271
bound, so that convergence is uniform in q.19 Let η denote the probability that a given











by using Lemma 1. A similar argument as before (27)i m p l i e st h a t
u(x) = ηn−1(tk−q−1 −rk−q)+(n−1)
F(x)−F(tk−q−1)
k−q
ηn−2E[y | y ∈[ tk−q−1 x]]+··· 
Similar argument as after equation (27) implies that all the terms except for the ﬁrst one












where dη/dtk−q stands for the derivative of η with respect to tk−q, taking indirect effects
through tk−q−1 and tk−q+1 into account.






































Equation (37)i m p l i e st h a t∂tk−q+1/∂tk−q is bounded in absolute value. Formula (36)











= 0  (39)
19Convergence is uniform in the reserve prices posted by the other sellers just like in Case 1.272 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Now, we establish that lim∂u(x)/∂tk−q|x=tk−q−1 = 0, which is equivalent to (see (35))


















Using formulas (34), (38), and (39) together with q ≤ q∗ implies that, indeed,
lim(n − 1)dη/dtk−q = 0 and thus lim∂u(x)/∂tk−q|x=tk−q−1 = 0. The envelope theorem





where  (y)denotes the winning probability of type y. It is straightforward to establish






To complete the proof it is sufﬁcient to show that lim∂Wk/∂tk−q > 0, which can be done
following similar arguments as in the other cases. 
























































Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition R
 
1(a) ≤ 0 becomes r ≥ r∗ = (n−1)a/((n − 1) +
(k−1)2) as was stated in the main text. The ﬁrst order condition corresponding to func-
tion   R1 can be calculated in a similar fashion.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Competing auctions 273
To characterize the second order condition, we take a derivative of the revenue with
























































































Let γ denote the bracketed term, i.e., γ(y)= R
 
1(y)/(nf(y)/k). For the second order con-
dition to hold, it is necessary and sufﬁcient that γ (a) ≤ 0, since that is equivalent to
showing that R
 
1 has the correct sign in a neighborhood of y = a. Then we need to in-
spect

































































































After substituting r∗ = a(n−1)/((n−1)+(k−1)2), this expression can be rewritten as
γ (a) = af(a)A(n k)−B(n k) 
It turns out that A(n k) < 0, B(n k) > 0 and thus the condition that γ (a) ≤ 0 becomes
af (a) ≥ a∗ =− B(n k)/A(n k). Moreover, one can establish that the cutoff value is in-274 Gábor Virág Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
deed a∗ = (k−1+(n−k)/k)/(k2 −2+n−k). Thedetailsofhowtocalculatetheseval-
ues are available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/
supp/538/supplement.pdf. 
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